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 1 
MODERN MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED* 
 
1. Introduction  
 
There has been a doctrinal revolution in private law, and its protagonist is the old indebitatus 
assumpsit count for money had and received. Over the last three decades, the many 
manifestations of that count have been revealed as hierophanies of a single truth: whether 
money is paid by mistake, stolen, or substituted without the owner’s consent, there is a 
‘normatively defective transfer of value’,1 producing an imbalance that we call unjust 
enrichment at the claimant’s expense.  
In what follows, I argue that this tendency towards unification has led us to exaggerate 
the role of value, thus obscuring the true contribution that ‘transfer’ makes to the conclusion 
that the defendant should give up cash that she received, and retarding efforts to develop 
conceptual tools that are sufficiently robust to cope with claims to recover bank money. 
In the first part of this article, I deal with claims that concern physical cash. I seek to 
show that ‘transfer of value’ is not an aggregate label for any event that prompts an economic 
change in the parties’ respective balance sheet positions; rather, ‘transfer’ labels the legal 
mechanism through which that change occurs. That mechanism differs for each category of 
money had and received, variously describing: (i) a transfer of legal title; (ii) a breach of 
exclusionary duty, and (iii) a substitution of trust rights. I argue that the only mechanism 
properly associated with a restitutionary action in unjust enrichment is (i), a title-transfer. 
                                               
* I am grateful to my referees, and to Caspar Bartscherer, Andrew Gold, Nick McBride, Charles Mitchell, Charlie 
Webb and Fred Wilmot-Smith for comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 29 [42] (Lord Reed); Lowick 
Rose v Swynson [2017] UKSC 32 [22] (Lord Sumption). 
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In the second part of this article, I show that when we came to shape the framework for 
restitutionary claims to bank money paid, we failed to maintain this focus on the legal 
mechanism by which a transfer is constituted. Instead, we took the passage of value per se as 
the fulcrum for liability, thus arrogating a great deal of explanatory latitude to these claims, 
and sidestepping the difficult task of locating anything normatively-akin to a title transfer in a 
bank payment from A to B. 
Two conceptions of value – discrete and abstract – precipitated corresponding tests for 
connecting the parties: (i) particularised as a notional cash asset, bank money could be followed 
through accounts in order to support the liability of a ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ payee; (ii) 
conceptualised as a shift in wealth, the abstract account admitted any causal link between debit 
and credit. The first borrows the logic of cash transfers, putatively obviating the need to account 
for a shift from material to intangible money. The second grounds liability in the mere fact of 
gain. Each encourages the conclusion that a third party defendant can be made to hand over a 
sum received as part of an independent transaction to which the claimant was not a party. 
By preferring a third version of that nexus – a search for some ‘single transaction’ to 
which A and B are each a party – the Supreme Court decision in Investment Trust Companies 
v Revenue and Customs Commissioners takes two important steps towards a more robust 
account of the normative connection between the parties:2  first, it encourages a renewed focus 
upon the legal mechanism through which value moves from one account to another; second, it 
allows us to address that task without cash fictions, by direct analysis of the legal content of a 
bank transfer from A to B. The final step that we must take, I argue, is to draw the parameters 
of the transactional account more clearly, and much more closely.  
 
 
                                               
2 Investment Trust Companies (n 1) [62] (Lord Reed). 
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2. Cash 
 
In what follows, I consider three instances of the old assumpsit count for money had and 
received, each of which has played a crucial role in shaping the modern framework for unjust 
enrichment. I show that the emphasis on value has lent an appearance of uniformity to these 
cases, which is belied by a close analysis of the operative facts. I argue that ‘transfer’ is a term 
of art, which labels the legal mechanism by which B is enriched and A disenriched, and that 
this mechanism differs for each instance of money had and received.  
 
A. Mistaken Payment 
  
(i) From indebitatus assumpsit to unjust enrichment 
 
In Moses v Macferlan,3 Lord Mansfield, a self-professed ‘friend’ to the count,4 summarised 
money had and received as follows: ‘the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon 
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the 
money’.5 Amongst the panoply of situations in which money had and received could be 
invoked were, he said: payments made by mistake; payments made under duress or undue 
influence; and payments made for a consideration that had failed.6  
It is difficult to overstate the conceptual importance of mistaken payment to our modern 
law of unjust enrichment. Birks began his second book, Unjust Enrichment, with a ‘core case’: 
Kelly v Solari was the ‘classic English illustration’ of mistaken payment, 7 and the pivotal 
                                               
3 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 97 ER 676. 
4 Towers v Barrett (1786) 1 Term Reports 133, 99 ER 1014. 
5 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 1012; 97 ER 676. 
6 ibid. 
7 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54, 152 ER 24. 
 4 
instance of unjust enrichment.8 In that case, insurers were held to be entitled to recover a sum 
paid by cheque to the widow of Mr Solari under a life insurance policy, which had in fact 
lapsed before the end of the life insured. Birks identified four features of the case through which 
he generalised a new ‘causative event’ – a ‘tertium quid’,9 distinct from consent and wrongs.  
The first feature was value: ‘In our core case a mistaken payee receives money. The 
generalization enlarges the receipt of money to enrichment [because] what works for money 
must work for value received in other forms’.10 The second was a transfer: ‘Payment also 
supposes that the enrichment happens by transfer from another. Enrichment by transfer from 
another generalizes to enrichment at the expense of another’.11 The third was injustice – 
described initially as a defect in the consent of the payor,12 later and more controversially as 
an ‘absence of basis’ for the payment.13 And the fourth was the innocence of the payee.14 From 
these features – a transfer of value, and a claimant-sided account of injustice – Birks 
extrapolated a law of ‘unjust enrichment’, the unique concern of which was the reversal of 
defective transfers of value. 
 
(ii) Value  
 
It is not easy to pin down precisely what is meant by ‘value’ and ‘value transfer’. For Birks, 
the best way to conceptualise enrichment was by means of a distinction between abstract and 
discrete wealth: 
 
                                               
8 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2004) 5. 
9 ibid 9. 
10 ibid 49. 
11 ibid 10. 
12 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (OUP 1985) ch VI-VII. 
13 Encapsulated by the common law label ‘unjust’, to the civilian ‘unjustified’ Birks (n 8) 155-156. 
14 ibid 5. 
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The first sees the person’s wealth as a list of particular assets, some corporeal, 
some incorporeal. This can be called the discrete conception of wealth, wealth 
as an inventory of distinct items such as a house, car, jewels, money, bank 
accounts, bonds, shares, and so on. The other conception envisages an 
individual’s wealth as a single fund with a money value. When a celebrity is 
said to be worth millions, the speaker is thinking in terms of an abstract fund. 
This can be called the abstract conception of wealth.15 
 
This is liable to confuse. We ordinarily reserve the term ‘wealth’ for abstract value alone: if 
exchange value describes the price that an asset is likely to fetch in a particular market, wealth 
describes the cumulative price of all the assets to which an individual has recourse, minus their 
liabilities. In short, wealth is the net worth of an individual. Birks’ ‘abstract’ value is wealth, 
of this kind.  
Birks’ ‘discrete conception’ does not refer to value per se; rather, it frames enrichment 
as a right that has value – title to a house or car, a bank account, bond or share. I do not need 
or intend to draw any conclusions here as to whether onerous rights, or rights with a negligible 
market value, should be recoverable in unjust enrichment,16 but it is worth pointing out that 
Birks’ discrete conception envisages a limited role for value: it acts as a threshold, excluding 
from the restitutionary remit of unjust enrichment the kind of rights with which State-endorsed 
markets are not properly concerned. So, title to a gold bar is an enrichment, recoverable either 
                                               
15 Birks (n 8) 69. 
16 I think it likely that both are correct: there are some rights that are repugnant to markets, which cannot be 
recovered by virtue of the law’s refusal to engage in those markets; there are rights with very little economic value 
that can nevertheless be recovered in unjust enrichment. Cf Robert Chambers, ‘Two Kinds of Enrichment’ in 
Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and James Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (OUP 2009) 255. 
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in specie or through ‘a substitutionary award in money’;17 children and body parts are not 
enrichments; ‘adjustment in money is unthinkable’.18  
In sum, Birks’ bifurcated model of enrichment gives us two ways to conceive of Mrs 
Solari’s enrichment: (i) a right; and (ii) a balance sheet increase.  
 
(iii) Transfer 
 
When we come to conceptualise ‘transfer’, there is a temptation to assume that the abstract 
view compels us to admit any causal link, as long as it brings about a net loss on one side of 
the equation and a net gain on the other. As Evans puts it: ‘value may be received (and, more 
importantly, retained) by the defendant in a manner causally linked to the claimant without any 
transactional link between them’.19 We should resist that temptation: whatever we do about 
enrichment, there is a very good reason to think that transfer is particularised either way.  
The problem with a wholesale commitment to the logic of the abstract view is 
exemplified prototypically as follows. Suppose that A mistakenly destroys a stamp – her own, 
and one of a pair; B owns the other stamp, the value of which is doubled as an immediate 
consequence. Each of the elements of the abstract enquiry is fulfilled, and yet: 
 
If I mistakenly destroy an asset I own and this causes your asset to increase in 
value, I cannot claim restitution against you despite the clear causal link 
between loss and gain. It is not just that there are good reasons to prevent claims 
in such factual situations; there is simply no reason for restitution at all.20 
 
                                               
17 Birks (n 8) 51-52. 
18 ibid.  
19 Simon Evans, ‘Rethinking tracing and the law of restitution’ (1999) 115 LQR 469, 479. 
20 Frederick Wilmot-Smith, ‘Taxing Questions’ (2015) 131 LQR 531, 534. 
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Our problem cannot be solved by reframing injustice so as to implicate the defendant 
more closely. Suppose instead that A and B own neighbouring shops, each of which sells 
identical produce. B lowers the price of items in her shop, hoping to drive custom away from 
A’s shop. B succeeds, and A’s takings for that period are substantially impoverished. Again, 
all elements of the abstract enquiry are met; yet, A has no claim in unjust enrichment. Indeed, 
as Lord Nicholls put it in OBG v Allan:21 
 
Competition between businesses regularly involves each business taking steps 
to promote itself at the expense of the other. One retail business may reduce its 
prices to customers with a view to diverting trade to itself and away from a 
competitor shop. Far from prohibiting such conduct, the common law seeks to 
encourage and protect it. The common law recognises the economic advantages 
of competition.22 
 
Each example involves an event that causes a net increase to B’s balance sheet, and a net 
decrease to A’s. Yet, neither involves the kind of event with which the law of unjust enrichment 
is concerned.  
In this way, we are propelled to the conclusion that it is not by virtue of any unjust 
wealth-conferring event that the law of unjust enrichment is engaged – and to which we ascribe 
the label ‘transfer’ – but rather by certain types of event. In Kelly v Solari, that event was a 
transfer of title: the source of Mrs Solari’s increase in purchasing power was the monetary asset 
that she received from the insurers. And if the particularised view of the relevant nexus is that 
there has been a ‘transfer of title from A to B’, the abstract view completes that sentence with 
                                               
21 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 
22 ibid [142]. 
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‘that causes B to be better off’. The width of the normative gap between these accounts is then 
determined by one’s view of the role ascribed to value within the reason for restitution. 
 
A. Theft 
 
(i) From indebitatus assumpsit to unjust enrichment  
 
The first writ for the recovery of chattels demanded that the plaintiff point to uniquely-
identifiable goods in the defendant’s hands at the time of the action.23 Accordingly, the lack of 
an ear-mark –  literally, that coins typically bore no marks of their holder –24 defeated a claim 
whenever money paid had not been segregated.25 Yet, high-denomination bank notes often 
were recorded by their issuee; in these cases the phrase ‘money has no ear-mark’ came to be 
shorthand for a defence awarded to the innocent purchaser of stolen cash,26 most notably 
described by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century case of Miller v Race.27 By removing the need 
to make enquiries as to the provenance of funds received, this step ensured functional 
homogeneity, lowering transaction costs and allowing currency to flow freely.28  
The logic of the protection afforded by this defence was later held to extend to the 
recipients of fiat money.29 It did not, however, extend to purchasers acting in the knowledge of 
                                               
23 This was true both of detinue on a bailment and detinue sur trover: even the bailee who drank a bottle of wine 
committed to his safekeeping could say that he no longer detained it. See J H Baker, An Introduction to English 
Legal History (4th edn, OUP 2002) 392.  
24 As opposed to their maker: discussions of this phrase often omit the fact that a great many of the coins in 
circulation bore the mark of their maker, a practice that was made mandatory by statute as early as 1363: Statute 
37 Edward III c.7 
25 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, vol II (F. Hargrave and C. Butler eds, 
18th Revised edn, London: J & W Clarke, R. Pheney and S. Brooke 1823) 286.  See also Anon BL MS Add 36941, 
fo 35v, LI MS Maynard 87, fo 145v, CUL MS LI 3, 8, fo 160 (CP) 
26 Ford v Hopkins (1700) 1 Salk 283, 91 ER 250; Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321 
326. 
27 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452, 97 ER 398. 
28 ibid [459] (Lord Mansfield).  
29 ibid. This step was placed on a statutory footing by the Bills of Exchange Act 1882. 
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a prior claim. In Clarke v Shee & Johnson,30 the claimant had employed a clerk to collect 
money due to him. Instead, the clerk used that money to buy lottery tickets. Lord Mansfield 
considered that the bad faith receipt of coins and notes rendered them ‘specific property’, such 
that ‘if their identity can be traced and ascertained, [the owner] has a right to recover’.31 
The remedy for tortiously taking or detaining money departed from trover with the 
development of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received in the seventeenth century. 
Yet, the formula was barely altered for these cases, mirroring the trover allegation perfectly: in 
Holiday v Sigil,32 an action for money had and received was brought to recover the value of a 
£500 note. Following the judge’s direction to consider whether the claimant had indeed 
established that ‘he lost this note, and that the defendant found it’, the jury found for the 
claimant, who was awarded damages of £500. 33  
Although the reason why the claimant acquired title to the cash was not raised in Clarke, 
there is nothing in his discussion to suggest that Lord Mansfield thought that what had been 
classified in Holiday as a wrong, for trover, was now to be thought of differently as an action 
in unjust enrichment: quite to the contrary, he considered that the case concerned whether 
money could be ‘brought back by the true owner’, who sued ‘for his identified property’.34 
Nevertheless, in 1991, these cases were repurposed by Lord Goff to support a nascent law of 
unjust enrichment.35  
In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale, Cass, one of the partners of a firm of solicitors, withdrew 
£323,222 from a client account in order to gamble at the defendant casino. The court ordered 
the casino to pay the firm £150,960, taking into account sums paid out as winnings. Citing 
                                               
30 (1774) 1 Cowp, 98 ER 1041. 
31 ibid 1043. 
32 Holiday v Sigil (1826) 2 Car & P 176, 172 ER 81, 
33 Clarke v Shee & Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp, 98 ER 1041. 
34 ibid 1043. 
35 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548. 
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Clarke v Shee & Johnson,36 Lord Goff explained that the action in that case and the instant one 
was ‘founded simply on the fact that, as Lord Mansfield said, the third party cannot in 
conscience retain the money – or, as we say nowadays, for the third party to retain the money 
would result in his unjust enrichment at the expense of the owner of the money’.37 
This case is a landmark in the law of unjust enrichment, the independent existence of 
which was then ‘put beyond question’ in England and Wales.38 Money misappropriation 
appeared to display precisely those hallmarks of unjust enrichment which Birks had 
extrapolated from mistaken payment: it was, said Birks, wholly inconsistent to exclude 
instances of ‘ignorance’, or a total want of consent to the impugned transaction, from a law of 
unjust enrichment that admitted restitution for mistake.39 The defendant had ‘usurped an 
earning opportunity that belonged to the claimant’;40 the claimant who sued in unjust 
enrichment thereby renounced her claim from property and claimed the ‘capital value’ of the 
asset as an enrichment acquired unjustly at her expense.41  
 
(ii) Value  
 
We saw above that the particularised view of the relevant nexus – at least as it applies to Kelly 
v Solari – is that there has been a ‘transfer of title from A to B’, and that the abstract view is 
concerned with the change in balance sheet positions that results. If either is to cope with theft, 
we must first account for the fact that theft does not confer upon the thief her victim’s title. 
                                               
36 (1774) 1 Cowp, 98 ER 1041. 
37 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548, 572. 
38 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 1999) 288. 
39 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (OUP 1985) 141. 
40 Mitchell McInnes, ‘Interceptive subtraction, unjust enrichment and wrongs - a reply to Professor Birks’ (2003) 
62 CLJ 697, 713. 
41 Birks (n 8) 66-67; Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 195. 
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Burrows purports to solve this problem by widening the category of enrichment. For 
Burrows, ‘enrichment in the law of unjust enrichment is assessed factually and not in terms of 
legal entitlement’.42 Thus, he if a defendant steals the claimant’s £100 banknote, he argues that 
‘factually, the defendant is enriched by £100 even though the banknote still belongs to the 
claimant’.43 Yet, it is not at all clear what ‘factual value’ means, nor that the measure of it 
should be £100.  
Let us assume that ‘factual value’ means ‘the price that the thief can fetch for onward 
sale’.44 In order to arrive at a true quantification of price, one would expect the court to take 
account of the relative juniority of the thief’s title, and the circumstances in which it was 
obtained.45 This would matter a great deal for non-money assets: a stolen car is highly unlikely 
to fetch the same price as one offered with proof of title, with access to an open market. In fact, 
the value of best title is the assumed benchmark for damages for money and non-money cases 
alike:46 the claimant does not sue recover the value of what the thief has, but the value of what 
she had.  
Birks offered one solution for this problem: the claimant could either sue to protect her 
property right, or renounce her title and claim the value in an action in unjust enrichment.47 In 
this way, the thief would acquire the claimant’s title, and the value of best title would be the 
appropriate quantum of liability. The objection to this solution has been put succinctly, and I 
think it must be correct: ‘How can the claimant simultaneously relinquish his title, and make a 
claim that the defendant has been unjustly enriched by the acquisition of that title?’.48  
                                               
42 Andrew Burrows, ‘The Relationship between Unjust Enrichment and Property: some Unresolved Issues’ in J 
Edelman and S Degeling (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Thomson) 335. 
43 Burrows (n 41) 195. 
44 See e.g. James Edelman, ‘The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment’ in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and 
James Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2008). 
45 See Robert Chambers, ‘Two Kinds of Enrichment’ in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and James Penner 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009) 250. 
46 See e.g. Young v Marshall (1831) 8 Bingham 43, 131 ER 316. 
47 Birks (n 8) 66. 
48 Lionel Smith, ‘Tracing’ in Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the Law (OUP 2006) 
121. 
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(iii) Transfer 
 
We have already seen that the recipient for value from a thief acquires a defence to the claim 
of the prior owner, so that there is a good reason for thinking that money in the hands of a thief 
is just as valuable as money that has not been stolen; we can thereby sidestep the objection 
identified immediately above. Yet, we cannot thus overcome a second problem, which is that 
the subject matter of the thief’s transaction is not the claimant’s title; rather, it is the title that 
the thief obtains by acquiring possession. If both the abstract and particularised conceptions of 
unjust enrichment depend upon a ‘transfer’, by which these cases are delineated from mere 
causal enrichment, we have not yet found one.  
But we need not look far. Unlike the claimant from whose shop business is diverted by 
the defendant’s competitive activities, the property-holder’s interest is one that the law 
recognises and protects. And unlike the claimant’s accidental destruction of her own asset, the 
defendant infringes that right by stealing the thing to which it relates. And this is the point: that 
breach of duty is not only important to showing that the defendant has acted unjustly; it also 
allows the claimant to substantiate a ‘transfer’ of the relevant kind.  
Yet, if this is so, it seems that we are dealing with something quite different from 
mistaken payment:49 one type of claim depends on the defendant’s breach, and allows the 
claimant to recover the value of her right; the other depends upon a title transfer from claimant 
to defendant, and allows the claimant to get the right back or its value (measured as an accretion 
to the defendant’s wealth).50 We are, I think, less likely to elide these distinctions if we continue 
                                               
49 See further William Swadling, ‘Ignorance and Enrichment: the Problem of Title’ (2008) 28 OJLS 627. 
50 This is not to argue that we cannot, at a certain level of abstraction, find a way of grouping both title transfer and 
breach of exclusionary duty within the same category –  which category we might label ‘protecting the decision-
making powers of property holders’ (I borrow this description from Charlie Webb, Reason and Restitution (OUP 
2016) 93-94). Rather, it is to argue that there are sound reasons for conducting this classificatory exercise at a 
lower level, at which they are kept apart. 
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to attribute the work of the former to the law of wrongs, reserving the label ‘unjust enrichment’ 
for the latter.   
 
 
C. Unauthorised Substitution 
 
(i) From indebitatus assumpsit to unjust enrichment 
 
Actions against factors for the price of goods were frequently brought in account,51 debt;52 
later, assumpsit,53 and as actions on the case for conversion.54 But none of these actions 
provided much assistance to a principal whose factor became insolvent prior to the action. 
Moreover, even if detinue could be brought for such of the original goods as remained in the 
factor’s hands,55 a Jacobean statute mandated that everything in a bankrupt’s hands at the onset 
of bankruptcy be distributed to his creditors.56 So, claimants turned to Chancery, and found 
their solution in the established law of trusts: a factor entitled to the goods at law might 
nevertheless be a trustee of the right for which he had agreed to be accountable.57 
The absurdity of denying a claim to a plaintiff who would succeed in a subsequent suit 
in Chancery drove the Common Law courts to reach an equivalent result. In Scott v Surman,58 
the claimants consigned tar to Scott as their factor, who sold it for promissory notes that were 
payable four months after delivery. Scott committed an act of bankruptcy, and his assignees 
                                               
 
51 Perton v Tumby YB 10 Edw II, Seldon Soc 54 109 (CP). 
52 Core v May KB 27/1097, m 33, Seldon Soc 94 327. 
53 Orwell v Mortoft YB Mich 20 Hen VII, fo 8, pl 18; (1505) B & M 406. 
54 Halliday v Higges BL MS Add 25203, fo 147v, YLS MS G R29 14, fo 15v, B & M 592. 
55 There is some disagreement over whether this was possible: Anon YB Mich. 41 Edw III fo 31 pl 37 (CP). 
56 An Act for the further Description of a Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors against such as shall become Bankrupts, 
and for inflicting of corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in some special Cases 21 Jac 1 Cap 19 1623. 
57 (1708) 2 Vern 638, 23 ER 1017. 
58 (1742) Willes 400, 125 ER 1235. 
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acquired the notes and received the money due on them. The assignees attempted to distinguish 
the equitable cases, claiming that the factor had acted outside his authority in selling the tar on 
credit. Willes J rejected this argument: ‘constant and daily experience’ he said, ‘shews that 
factors do sell upon credit without such a special authority. If it were otherwise, it would be 
the greatest prejudice to trade’.59 To avoid circuity of action,60 he found for the claimants, 
concluding that the debt owing in any such case would ‘follow the nature of the thing out of 
which it is produced’.61  
Thus, the factor’s authority governed the claim in equity, and the parasitic claim at law, 
throughout the 18th Century. Yet, when in 1815 Willes J’s conclusion was repackaged as a 
reason for extending the reach of money had and received to rights acquired without 
authority,62 this part of the history of money had and received was overshadowed permanently. 
In Taylor v Plumer,63 Plumer gave his stockbroker, Walsh, a draft to buy Exchequer 
bills. Walsh exchanged it for Bank of England notes, with which he bought US government 
stock and Portugese gold coins. Plumer’s agent apprehended him in the process of attempting 
to abscond, and took the stock and coins. Walsh’s assignees in bankruptcy brought an action 
against Plumer, alleging that title had vested in them through Walsh’s act of bankruptcy. 
The assignees conceded that a principal could recover specific goods, or the product of 
such goods, in the possession of a bankrupt agent who had acted in pursuance of the trust.64 
The line, they argued, was at property that was acquired in fraud of the trust.65 In light of Scott 
v Surman, and several other authorities prior to Taylor v Plumer,66 they ought to have been on 
firm ground. Lord Ellenborough, however, considered that that argument was ‘mischievous in 
                                               
59 ibid 407. 
60 ibid 405. 
61 ibid 404. 
62 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562, 105 ER 721. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid 723. 
65 ibid 723. 
66 Perry v Phelips (1790) 1 Ves Jr 251, 30 ER 327; Cox v Bateman (1715) 2 Ves Sen 19, 28 ER 13; Gladstone v 
Hadwen (1813) 1 M & S 517, 105 ER 193. 
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principle, and supported by no authorities of law’.67 Echoing the words of Willes J in Scott v 
Surman, but giving them an explanatory force that Willes J had not, he said: 
 
If the property in its original state and form was covered with a trust in favour 
of the principal, no change of that state and form can divest it of such trust …for 
the product of or substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the 
thing itself…68 
 
Thus, agents could now be made accountable – whatever the parameters of their authority – on 
the basis of an enduring metaphysical connection between the trust right and its product.  
Prior to Taylor, the term ‘tracing’ described the process of locating physical money.69 
After it, the label also came to describe asset substitution, and in 1997 this emerged as a fully-
fledged theory of exchange product tracing: 
 
The fundamental idea underlying tracing is that sometimes, for certain legal 
purposes, one asset stands in the place of another. A claim which could have 
been made in relation to the original asset is allowed in relation to the new 
asset… Tracing is the process which can allow the transmission of that claim 
to the new asset.70 
 
Yet, the etymological implication of continuity remained crucial. It permitted judges and 
academics at once to point out that the exchange product was different from the right 
                                               
67 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562, 105 ER 721, 725–726. 
68 ibid 726. 
69 Holiday v Sigil (1826) 2 Car & P 176, 172 ER 81; Clarke v Shee & Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp, 98 ER 1041. This 
is now considered to be the exclusive preserve of ‘following’: Lionel Smith, The Law of Tracing (OUP 1997). 
70 Lionel Smith, The Law of Tracing (OUP 1997) 3. 
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substituted,71 and to insist that a sufficiently close association existed between them that a good 
deal of the explanatory work for the claim could be found in the substitution itself: 
 
[W]e trace value: it is the only constant that exists before, through and after the 
substitution through which we trace. It exists in a different form after the 
substitution, and that is what can justify a claim to the new asset.72 
 
This has led to spirited disagreement about the appropriate categorisation of claims for 
which tracing is a prerequisite. If the old right is, in some meaningful sense, the right for which 
it is substituted, a ‘continuing beneficial interest’ can simply persist throughout the 
substitution.73 This argument was preferred unanimously by the House of Lords in Foskett v 
McKeown.74 For Birks, however, it would not do to elide new and old rights; the substitute 
right in the hands of the trustee was a new right, and a new justification must be found for any 
claim to it.75 As that claim was not based on consent, nor any wrong, it must belong to unjust 
enrichment: although the substitute asset did not originate from the claimant, nevertheless it 
was obtained using something that did. Thus, the traceable product represented ‘wealth that 
had moved from the claimant absolutely without her consent’.76 
 
(ii) Value  
 
                                               
71 ibid 119. 
72 ibid. 
73 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102. Birks called this the ‘leech theory’, dismissing it for failing altogether to 
provide an explanation for the fact that the beneficiaries acquired a new and different right: Birks, ‘Property, 
Unjust Enrichment and Tracing’ (2001) 54 CLP 231, 244. 
74 ibid. 
75 Peter Birks, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing’ (2001) 54 CLP 231. 
76 ibid 246-247. 
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The role of value in unauthorised substitution is twofold: first, and in the ordinary way, the 
claimant points to an asset acquired by the defendant; secondly, and unusually, value also 
describes a connection between that asset and the one held by or for the claimant.  
The second demands that we think about value in a different way from price or wealth. 
I have demonstrated elsewhere that when ‘value’ is deployed in tracing, it usually refers to the 
potential for exchange inherent in an assignable right.77 Yet, this potential cannot be move 
independently of the thing, so that ‘value’ adds nothing to what we say when we describe a 
substitution, one right for another.78 What we must explain – to which I turn now – is how it is 
that product of a rights exchange (or the value that it adds to the defendant’s balance sheet) 
represents a transfer from the claimant.   
 
(iii) Transfer 
 
There are two dominant explanations for what I will call the ‘Substitution Rule’, which is that 
the claimant whose right is exchanged for another acquires a claim to the exchange product. 
Although they attract different labels – one ‘unjust enrichment’, the other ‘property’ – each 
depends upon the idea that the Substitution Rule restores to the claimant something that is 
rightfully hers, and each applies the Substitution Rule to: (i) a substitution made by a trustee 
without authority; (ii) a substitution made by a thief of some thing from the claimant.  
For Birks, the ‘acquisitive opportunities’79 properly attributable to A (owner) are 
‘usurped’ whenever A’s asset is exchanged without her consent,80 so that the substitute asset 
                                               
77 Tatiana Cutts, ‘Tracing, Value and Transactions’ (2016) 79 MLR 381, 395-396. 
78 ibid and James Penner, ‘Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment’ in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and 
James Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009) 309: ‘When one realises the 
exchange value [of something one owns], what one must reliquish is one’s property. One never has the two of 
them at the same time’. 
79 Peter Birks, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing’ (2001) 54 CLP 231, 245. 
80 ibid 246, fn 35; Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [7-14]. See also See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of 
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in the hands of B (thief or trustee) – though it did not actually emanate from A – nevertheless 
represents a wealth-transfer from A to B. We saw above that Birks dismissed the notion that 
property could justify the Substitution Rule. Yet, a more refined version of that thesis accounts 
for that rule in a fashion very similar to his own. For Webb, the ‘means to acquire other items 
of wealth through exchange’ is an incident of A’s ownership,81 which B ‘as a matter of fact’ 
places herself in the position to exploit.82 In the event of any such exploitation, the Substitution 
Rule ensures that it is A, not B, to whom the benefit adheres.83 Thus, for both Birks and Webb, 
B is accountable because she has usurped an incident of A’s ownership; the Substitution Rule 
diverts the fruits to A.   
Let us first test this usurpation thesis against the example of the substituting thief. Here, 
the Substitution Rule clearly does not follow from a ‘transfer’ akin to a mistaken cash payment: 
we have already seen that no title moves from A to B, and the rule does not purport to undo the 
effects of any transaction between them. Rather, as above, we are dealing with an infringement 
of some aspect of the claimant’s entitlement. The difficulty here lies in the additional step that 
the Substitution Rule requires us to take, which is to explain A’s connection with the new asset. 
Again, we must be careful to distinguish title from the thing to which it relates. What 
B ‘as a matter of fact’ acquires through theft is a new legal title to the thing stolen, and it is this 
claim that B exploits through substitution. A retains her title, and her claim against B is the 
same throughout, which is an action in respect of B’s breach of an obligation not to interfere 
with the object of A’s title.84 That is the extent of the law’s protection for legal title. 
                                               
Restitution (revised edn, OUP 1989) 394 (‘geometric multiplication’); Lionel Smith, The Law of Tracing (OUP 
1997) 358–361. 
81 Webb (n 50) 183. 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid 184. 
84 The substitution also awards A a new claim against the recipient, unless, of course, the thing is money and the 
recipient is in good faith: Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452, 97 ER 398. 
 19 
Trustee substitutions present a similar explanatory hurdle for the usurpation thesis: the 
title that the trustee substitutes is her own; it is not the beneficiary’s equitable claim, which 
persists for so long as a defence cannot be raised.85 Yet, there is a broader repertoire of 
protections for equitable ownership, and not all support a duty that is negative in form.  
The scope of the fiduciary role had expanded long before Taylor v Plumer: after 1726, 
the trustee was no longer accountable only for an asset acquired within her authority, or 
otherwise by drawing upon the trust fund; she was accountable for any asset acquired within a 
particular zone of activity linked to her position as trustee, as a matter of primary right.86 The 
case for Walsh’s liability might have been made in this way – not on the basis of any breach 
of duty or because Walsh was enriched unjustly at Plumer’s expense – but because of a rule, 
developed in the early Georgian era, that the trustee who acquires a right whilst (mis)managing 
the trust fund cannot easily escape from her duty to hand it to her principal.  
It must be emphasised that I do not mean to suggest that the expanded notion of 
fiduciary responsibility actually informed the decision in Taylor v Plumer itself, nor any case 
that has borrowed the logic of tracing from it (of which there are many). I have simply sought 
to show that the ‘transfer’ identified by the Substitution Rule cannot be readily explained with 
the conceptual tools that we have aggregated so far, and that it might help us to look, not only 
at what A had at the start of the story, but also at the scope and content of B’s duties to her.   
 
 
 
3. Bank Money 
                                               
85 Even if a defence can be raised to the claim of the beneficiary, it is now settled that this defence operates to hold 
the beneficiary’s claim in abeyance, rather than to defeat it: Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees 
[2012] EWCA Civ 195; [2013] Ch 91. 
86 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223. See further Lionel Smith, ‘Constructive trusts and the no-
profit rule’ (2013) 72 CLJ 260. 
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Thus far, I have considered three instances of the old action for money had and received as it 
was invoked in cases concerning physical cash, each of which has been described as an action 
to reverse a defective ‘transfer of value’. I have sought to make good three claims: (i) that 
‘transfer’ is a term of art, and it describes the legal mechanism by which wealth is conveyed 
from one party to another; (ii) that this feature differs in each category of money had and 
received; and (iii) that the term ‘unjust enrichment’ should be reserved for an unjust transfer of 
title.  
 In this part, I show that when we came to shape the framework for restitutionary claims 
to bank money paid, we failed to maintain our focus on the legal mechanism through which 
wealth passes. Instead, we took the passage of value per se as the fulcrum for liability. This 
precipitated two tests, which broadly correspond to Birks’ distinction between discrete and 
abstract value: (i) particularised as a notional cash asset, bank money could be followed 
through accounts in order to support the liability of a ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ payee; (ii) 
conceptualised as a shift in wealth, the abstract account admitted any causal link between debit 
and credit. The conceptual poverty of each has led courts to extend liability to recipients of 
value with whom the claimant has no normative link. 
By reframing the test as a search for some ‘single transaction’ to which A and B are 
each a party,87 the Supreme Court decision in Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners offers us an opportunity to leave behind cash fictions, and to refocus 
our attention upon the legal mechanism by which a ‘transfer of value’ is constituted. In what 
follows, I argue that a bank transfer – effected by payor and payee bank as agents for the parties 
to it – is a legal mechanism sufficient to sustain a claim in unjust enrichment, and that this legal 
mechanism must be understood more narrowly than has been popular hitherto. 
                                               
87 Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 29 [62] (Lord Reed). 
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A. Discrete Enrichment 
 
(i) Translation 
 
Given what has been said so far, it is not immediately clear what permits us to conclude that 
the parties to a bank transfer are also parties to a ‘transfer of value’ for the purposes of an action 
in unjust enrichment. In Uren v First National Home Finance,88 Mann J considered that:  
 
There should be some proper connection between the payment of the money 
and the enrichment. That is usually achieved in unjust enrichment cases by 
demonstrating money flowing from A to B, or money flowing from A to B's 
benefit because, for example, it has been spent on B's property.89  
 
In cases that involve the payment of bank money by A to B, that link attracts little discussion; 
it seems ‘obvious that the defendant’s enrichment must have been gained “at the claimant’s 
expense” on any sensible view of what that term means’.90 Yet, such statements overstate the 
simplicity of the explanatory task. In any bank transfer from A to B, and unlike the mistaken 
cash payment in Kelly v Solari, no asset changes hands.91 Indeed, as Webb puts it, ‘we might 
say there is no true transfer at all’.92 
                                               
88 Uren v First National Home Finance Ltd [2005] EWHC 2529 (Ch). 
89 ibid [26]. 
90 Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [6-02]: this remains from the 8th edition. 
91 R v Preddy [1996] AC 815. 
92 Webb (n 50) 98. This is true both for the notion that there is a title, and for the idea that some intangible asset 
has been assigned: Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Banker’s Trust Co [1989] QB 728, 750. See also Agip v Jackson 
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One way of explaining away this distinction is simply to make an argument for the 
analogical application of cash principles; the relevant ‘transfer’ is then simply located in a 
notional title-transfer. For Fox, there is no contradiction in recognising the nature of bank 
money as obligational, and – provided that ‘due allowance is made for the different ways in 
which legal and beneficial title to money is enforced’ – describing it by reference to principles 
of property.93  
Webb, too, purports to solve the problem of identifying a ‘transfer’ with a functional 
argument for conceptualising bank money as cash: 
 
[M]y bank account is not a repository of cash and the transfer of funds from my 
account to yours is not a handing over of cash from me to you. But it serves the 
same function, taking funds at my disposal and making them available to you. 
And so while this transfer of funds is in one sense notional, since there need be 
nothing which passes from me to you… it is no mistake for the law to treat this 
sort of transfer as a payment, as (at least for most purposes) equivalent to the 
handing over of that same sum in cash.94 
 
Thus, the claim in unjust enrichment to bank money unjustly paid is ‘justified by an extension 
of the same reasoning as justifies my claim in the case where my mistaken payment takes the 
form of cash’.95 Let us call this ‘translation’: for the purposes of an action in unjust enrichment, 
                                               
[1990] Ch 265, 286 (Millett J) ‘nothing passes but a stream of electrons’, and Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] 
Ch 547, 561 (Fox LJ) ‘nothing passes in specie’. 
93 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) [1.77]. 
94 Webb (n 50) 98-99. 
95 ibid. 
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the relevant connection between the parties to a bank payment is supplied by treating bank 
money as if it were physical cash.96  
 
(ii) Tracing and translation 
 
Translation is mostly obviously at work in triangular situations, in which the intervention of 
some third party, C, assists in effecting the money transfer from A to B. In these cases, B’s 
liability has been justified on the basis that, though A and B have not dealt with one another, 
B nevertheless received A’s money asset. 
In Banque Belge v Hambrouck,97 an employee had forged his employer’s signature, 
thereby procuring a transfer of some £6000 from his employer’s account to his own account at 
Farrow’s bank. Hambrouck then drew cheques on this account, giving them to his mistress, 
Mlle Spanoghe, who credited her account with corresponding sums. The Court of Appeal held 
that Banque Belge could recover £315 then standing in Mlle Spanoghe’s account as its 
property. Taylor v Plumer permitted ‘money though changed in character to be recovered, if it 
can be traced’,98 and as she had given no  valuable consideration, Mlle Spanoghe could not ‘set 
up a title derived from Hambrouck, who had no title against the true owner’.99 
In Trustee of FC Jones v Jones,100 Mr Jones had drawn cheques in his wife’s favour on 
his insolvent firm. She used the funds thereby credited to her account to speculate successfully 
in potato futures. The trustee in bankruptcy was held to be entitled to ‘trace his money at 
Midland Bank into the money in the defendant’s account with the commodity brokers’,101 and 
                                               
96 Fox uses the term in a similar way: ‘the full process of ‘translation’ from one monetary form to another is rarely 
spelled out’ David Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) [1.03]. 
97 [1921] 1 KB 321. 
98 Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321, 330. 
99 ibid. 
100 [1997] Ch 159. 
101 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch 159, 170. 
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to claim the proceeds of her investments as its property. Lord Millett called this claim 
‘exclusively proprietary’,102 concluding that, ‘as from the date of the act of bankruptcy the 
money in the bankrupts’ joint account at Midland Bank belonged to the trustee’.103  
According to Burrows, these cases exemplify a ‘title and tracing’ exception to the 
ordinary rule that the claimant must be the ‘direct provider’ of the defendant’s enrichment, 
which operates in the same way as unauthorised substitution: ‘by means of tracing and title, a 
claimant can show that value in a substitute asset comprises a transfer of value from the 
claimant: one is tracing value as it is transferred from the claimant’s asset to its substitute’.104  
Yet, even if we were to admit unauthorised substitution as a species of unjust 
enrichment, it is not clear on what basis we are entitled to extrapolate from the conclusion in 
Taylor v Plumer, that a trustee who swaps one trust right for another can be made accountable 
for the product, to the conclusion that money in the account of some third party represents the 
traceable product of money debited from the claimant’s account. Whilst ‘tracing value’ is 
intended to indicate a ‘substitution… by some person’,105 the product of any putative 
substitution in a bank transfer from A to B remains with A. If a bank transfer is a substitution 
at all,106 it is two substitutions: (i) A’s right to her old balance for A’s right to her new balance; 
and (ii) B’s right to her old balance for B’s right to her new balance. But this, of course, gives 
us no solution for our problem – which is to show that (i) and (ii) are connected.  
There was a trick in the extension of tracing to bank payments, and we missed it. In 
Banque Belge and FC Jones their Lordships were not ‘tracing value’ through asset 
substitutions; they were following a notional money asset from the claimant’s account to that 
                                               
102 ibid 168. 
103 ibid 166. This nominally produced the absurd result that the trustee in bankruptcy was creditor, and in practice 
permitted the claimant to recover the original sum and profits, all of which had been paid into court. 
104 Burrows (n 41) 119. 
105 Lionel Smith, The Law of Tracing (OUP 1997) 134 (emphasis added). 
106 This was doubted in Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Limited [2004] NSWCA 82 [139], and Hillig 
v Darkinjung [2006] NSWSC 1217 [20]. 
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of the defendant. This is how it was possible for each court to conclude that the claimant had 
retained title in each case (or to have had it revested automatically upon rescission).107 
Moreover, this is why Lord Millett saw nothing wrong with the conclusion that the trustee’s 
claim in FC Jones was both a claim at law, and a property claim: the subject matter of that 
claim was not the bank debt – which could only have been owing to Mrs Jones, and which 
could not have been ‘owned’ at all – but the notional money asset that it represented.  
Thus it is that the ‘intervention of a third hand’ simply ‘makes no difference’ in these 
cases.108 Translation goes to show that the defendant has received the claimant’s property, so 
that – in Birks’ words – ‘it does not matter how many intermediate hands it has passed 
through’.109  Yet, this is not the logic of unauthorised substitution; it is (for better or worse) the 
logic of theft: the normative claim, which I will examine in what follows, is not that B 
substituted a right to which A had a claim; rather, it is that B received A’s money asset, thereby 
breaching the exclusionary obligation of which property is constituted. It is the imposition of 
this obligation that we must justify, when we justify translation. 
 
(iii) Justifying translation 
 
Given the manifest reluctance to subject third parties to undiscoverable exclusionary duties for 
intangible assets,110 one might have expected a robust defence for translation: in any bank 
payment from A to B, the asset is not merely intangible; it is altogether invented. In fact, very 
little has been written on the subject. 
                                               
107 Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321, 332. For why this is difficult to make sense of 
without viewing the case through the lens of a notional money asset see Ben McFarlane, ‘Unjust Enrichment, 
Property Rights, and Indirect Recipients’ ’ [2009] RLR 37, 41-42. 
108 Birks (n 8) 86. 
109 ibid 86. 
110 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1; Your Response v Datateam Business Media [2014] EWCA 
Civ 281. 
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Webb makes one argument from functional homogeneity: a bank transfer is ‘equivalent 
to the handing over of that same sum in cash’ because it amounts to the depletion of a facility 
to put the holder in funds that is ‘matched exactly and directly’ by an addition to that of the 
transferee.111 But that nexus is precisely what is at issue, here: the kind of directness that 
Webb’s thesis demands is the passage of an asset. The kind that a bank transfer actually 
displays involves aggregating the various payment instructions and acts of participating banks 
into ‘elements of a single transaction, with the single intended effect of my paying you’.112 The 
argument is bootstrap: a payment is only ‘direct’ in the relevant sense if we first pretend that 
bank transfers are property transfers; we cannot then locate our justification for treating them 
like this in their directness. 
The current editor of Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money makes a different, 
instrumental, case: ‘consistency and a respect for precedent’ demand that bank media be made 
to ‘display characteristics which are in most respects similar to the more traditional, physical 
form of money’; only then will bank money be made to circulate as such.113 These 
characteristics are: (i) a money transfer must be treated as a discharge of an equivalent liability 
for which it is paid, and (ii) money must be generally irrecoverable from a good faith payee.114 
But the distinction between (i) and (ii) is key. We saw in the first part of this article that 
the point of having an idiosyncratic private property system for cash is to ensure the free 
currency of money by affording confidence to the holder that they will not be deprived of it.115 
For bank payments, that confidence is already supplied by the irrevocability of the payment 
instruction by which credit is transferred.116 The rule in Miller v Race is necessary only if we 
first pretend that bank money is property – which is precisely the step for which we still lack 
                                               
111 Webb (n 50) ibid 99 
112 ibid.  
113 ibid. 
114 ibid. 
115 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452, 97 ER 398. 
116 The Brimnes [1973] 1 WLR 386; Tayeb v HSBC Bank [2004] EWCH 1529, [2004] 4 All ER 1024. 
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an explanation. What we need, it turns out, is an argument for undermining transactional 
security, and we do not yet have one. 
If we cannot find a good justification for treating bank money as physical cash, we must 
look elsewhere to explain how it is that a bank payment from A to B, which is not an asset 
transfer, nevertheless comes to substantiate the requisite connection for the purposes of an 
action in unjust enrichment. 
 
A. Abstract Enrichment 
 
(i) From causation to transaction  
 
We saw above that an abstract conception of value encourages a broad causal view of the event 
by which it is conveyed.117 Accordingly, Birks advocated adopting a causal approach to ‘at the 
expense of’ in Unjust Enrichment.118 In 2011, the editors of Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment adopted this approach, concluding that: ‘a “but for” causal connection’ might be 
enough to establish the requisite nexus.119  Henderson J was persuaded of the merits of this 
move at first instance in Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners,120 and in 2015, the UK Supreme Court adopted his formulation in toto.  
                                               
117 See the text accompanying fn 18-23. 
118 Birks (n 8) 89-98. See also Stephen Watterson, ‘Direct Transfers" in the Law of Unjust Enrichment’ (2011) 64 
CLP 435. 
119 Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson (eds) Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (8th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) [6-25]. They seek to clarify this approach in the latest edition. They state that: ‘On 
further reflection, we consider that it would be more conceptually accurate, and less productive of 
misunderstanding, to place a stronger emphasis on the need for a qualifying “transaction” involving the claimant 
and the defendant. It is the transaction that provides the qualifying link, rather than causal links alone’ Charles 
Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) [6-09]. 
120 Investment Trust Companies (n 1) [68]. 
 28 
In Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus,121 the claimant bank sought to be subrogated to an 
unpaid vendor’s lien with respect to a property, belonging to Melissa Menelaou, that was 
purchased with funds procured by releasing its charge on her parents’ property. A majority of 
the Supreme Court concluded that the claimant could substantiate the connection by proof that 
the defendant’s enrichment would not have occurred ‘but for’ the claimant’s loss: ‘The 
question in each case’, said Lord Clarke, ‘is whether there is a sufficient causal connection, in 
the sense of a sufficient nexus or link, between the loss to the [claimant] and the benefit 
received by the defendant’.122  
I have already argued that the move from abstract value to a causal test involves a 
conceptual mistake. The abstract account of enrichment does not require us also to give an  
abstract account of ‘transfer’; if we do, we will extend liability to very many defendants with 
whom the claimant has no normative link. Fortunately, that extension was to be short-lived.  
In Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners (hereafter 
‘ITC’),123 the claimants sought restitution from HMRC of sums paid by investment managers 
(‘the Managers’) to discharge a putative tax liability from which the Managers were in fact 
exempt under EU law.124 The claimants sought to ground their claim in an earlier payment that 
they had made to the managers in respect of services provided by the latter, called ‘VAT’ and 
paid on the understanding that it was so due. Giving judgment for the Supreme Court, Lord 
Reed rejected the causal premise of the claimants’ arguments for a want of consistency with 
‘centuries’ worth of relevant authorities’.125 Lord Reed considered that a claim in unjust 
enrichment required proof of a ‘direct transfer’,126 and that only a direct payment, or ‘a single 
                                               
121 Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176. 
122 ibid [27] (Lord Clarke). 
123 Investment Trust Companies (n 1). 
124 ibid [9]. 
125 ibid [40]. 
126 ibid.  
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scheme or transaction’127 could substantiate such a transfer. In the instant case, there was no 
such ‘single scheme’; rather, there were ‘two separate transactions - first, between the 
Claimants and the Managers, and secondly between the Managers and the Commissioners’.128 
Thus, HMRC’s enrichment was not at the claimants’ expense.  
ITC represents a welcome move away from both the fictional premise of translation, 
and the conceptual misstep of the causal model. By recognising openly that ‘transfer of value’ 
is not a test for liability – rather, it is a label that is attached to the conclusion that some 
qualifying event has occurred – Lord Reed encourages us to focus our attention upon the 
normative role that a bank transfer plays in an action for restitution of an unjust enrichment.129 
The task, then, is to describe that qualifying event more precisely. 
 
 
(ii) Bank transfers and transactions 
 
According to Smith, in any action to undo an unjust payment, it is possible to determine ‘who 
has been enriched, and at whose expense’ by simply ‘determining what the rights and 
obligations of the parties were before the payment and after it’.130 But it is not clear precisely 
which feature of the rights and obligations of A and B who are parties to a bank transfer will 
help us to conduct this enquiry. It cannot be the presence of an obligation to pay: in ITC, as in 
Kelly v Solari before it, the problem with the payment was precisely the absence of such an 
obligation. Indeed, if payment refers the discharge of a liability to pay, then unjust payment is 
something of a misnomer.  
                                               
127 ibid [61]. 
128 ibid [72]. 
129 ibid [43]. 
130 Lionel Smith, ‘Three-Party Restitution: A Critique of Birks’s Theory of Interceptive Subtraction’ (1991) 11 
OJLS 481, 519. 
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Yet, this is not the only putative change in the legal relations upon which we might 
focus. Let us assume that A and B are customers of separate banks – Bank A and B respectively. 
In order to effect a credit transfer to B’s account with Bank B, A issues a payment instruction 
to her bank, Bank A. If the account is in credit, Bank A must usually accept and comply. To 
do this, Bank A takes two steps: it alters the content of its own payment liability to A, and 
issues another payment instruction to Bank B; this is effected either by debiting Bank A’s 
account with Bank B, or by adjusting the balances of each with some common banker.131 And 
this, I think, is what is meant by the notion that there is a ‘direct transfer’ in these cases: A and 
B are each on the receiving end of the steps that participating banks take to alter their legal 
positions to give effect to A’s payment instruction.132  
McFarlane has described this legal mechanism as a loss and acquisition of rights;133 
elsewhere, it has been described as a mere alteration (reduction or accretion) to A and B’s 
rights.134 It is worth pointing out that the nature of Bank A and Bank B’s liability to pay is just 
that – a liability, until a demand for payment is made.135 The term ‘right’ must, therefore, be 
understood broadly here. Whether there is indeed a loss and acquisition of rights, understood 
thus, simply depends upon the level of abstraction at which the transfer is viewed. If the balance 
of each of A and B’s account is £10, and A transfers £5 to B, we can either say that: (i) A has 
lost a claim to £10, acquiring a claim to £5 in its place, and B has lost a claim to £10, acquiring 
a claim to £15 in its place; or (ii) the content of the banks’ payment liabilities have been altered, 
                                               
131 Fox [5.20]. Of course, this is not usually done on the basis of a single transaction, but rather the net sums owing 
by each once the process of clearing is complete: [5.21].  
132 Mitchell is correct, I think, to point out that what matters for the purposes of determining who has the right to 
sue is whether the bank is entitled to resort to the client’s account in the event of an impugned (e.g. unauthorised 
or mistaken) payment. See further: Charles Mitchell, ‘Banks, Agency, and Unjust Enrichment’ in John Lowry and 
Loukas Mistelis (eds) Commercial Law: Perspectives and Practice (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) 109-121. 
133 Ben McFarlane, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Rights and Value’ in D. Nolan and A. Robertson (eds), Rights and Private 
Law (Hart 2014). 
134 Fox [5.23]. 
135 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Banker’s Trust Co [1989] QB 728. 
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but not novated. Either way, a bank transfer is a legal mechanism distinct from an asset transfer; 
that mechanism connects A and B because participating banks act as agents on their behalf.  
If agency meets the test for directness in bank payments cases, what remains of the 
notion that a ‘single scheme or transaction’ suffices to show that B is A’s direct enrichee? I 
will deal first with one type of indirect transactional link for which some academics have 
argued; second, I will address two cases that Lord Reed considered in ITC,136 and another case 
for which judgment was handed down on the same day as ITC.137  
 
(iii) Subrogation to a causally-connected transaction 
 
There may well be an argument from expediency for allowing the claimant to bypass her payee, 
and proceed directly against a counterparty to some defective payment that is not the claimant’s 
own.138 This can be explained straightforwardly by reference to the facts of ITC. As it stood, 
the managers could not have recovered from HMRC for the sums in question, those claims 
being time-barred under s80(4) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994. But suppose that the 
managers could have recovered from HMRC; rather than requiring the managers to sue, and 
the claimants to sue the managers in turn, the same result is achieved at substantially less time 
and cost by allowing the claimant to sue HMRC directly.  
Importantly, however, subrogation to a causally-connected transaction must only be 
allowed if both claims are valid; if – as it happened – HMRC had a defence to the managers’ 
claim, it ought to be entitled to avail itself of that defence in a direct action by the claimants.139  
                                               
136 Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221; Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus [2015] 
UKSC 66; [2016] AC 176. 
137 Lowick Rose v Swynson [2017] UKSC 32. 
138 Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [6-28]. James Edelman and Elise Bant, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Hart 2016)105 
(though they call it ‘tracing’). 
139 Cf James Edelman and Elise Bant, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Hart 2016) 100-109. 
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(iv) Rectification by subrogation  
 
Lord Reed’s widened notion of a ‘composite transaction’ was informed by two cases:140 the 
first was Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd;141 the second was Menelaou v 
Bank of Cyprus.142 In what follows, I argue that: (i) these cases do not exemplify a transactional 
nexus between claimant and defendant; and (ii) their logic is not that of fixing, not reversing, 
transactions, so that (iii) they should not be allowed to obscure the contribution that ITC makes 
to identifying the legal mechanism by which a transfer of value is effected.  
In Banque Financière, a loan by the claimants (‘BFC’) to the first defendants (‘Parc’) 
had been effected in two steps, one Mr Herzig acting as intermediary. That loan was made on 
the understanding that Parc would repay part of a sum due to Royal Trust Bank (Switerzland) 
(‘RTB’), secured by a first charge upon its property, and that all other claims by companies in 
the group to which Parc belonged would be subordinated to that of BFC. Mr Herzig did not, 
however, have authority to bind one such company – Omnicorp Overseas Ltd (‘OOL’) – whose 
debt was secured by a second charge over Parc’s property. Parc’s payment had the effect of 
discharging RTB’s charge, and promoting that of OOL. 
Lord Steyn dealt with ‘at the expense of’ as if there had been a single step, insisting 
that the interposition of Mr Herzig could not be allowed to obscure the ‘reality that OOL was 
enriched by the money advanced by BFC via Mr Herzig to Parc’.143 The remedy from 
subrogation was ‘a means by which the court regulates the legal relationships between a 
plaintiff and a defendant or defendants in order to prevent unjust enrichment’;144 applied to the 
                                               
140 Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners (n 1) [65]. 
141 [1999] 1 AC 221. 
142 [2015] UKSC 66; [2016] AC 176. 
143 ibid 227. 
144 Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v Parc (Battersea) Ltd 236 [1999] 1 AC 221. 
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instant case, that meant subrogating BFC to RTB’s first charge (revived), for the purposes of 
securing BFC’s repayment in priority to OOL. 
Banque Financière is not an easy case. Even if we are able to ignore the interposition 
of Mr Herzig, this does not warrant the conclusion that OOL was a party to the impugned loan; 
if it had been,  the claim would not have been necessary at all. It therefore seems impossible to 
avoid the conclusion that OOL’s legal position was altered as a causal product of the loan to 
which it was not party.   
The second problem is that the remedy follows an entirely different pattern from the 
restitutionary action to reverse an unjust enrichment. The counterfactual that ordinarily governs 
the claim in unjust enrichment is ‘what position were the parties in before the transaction 
occurred?’; in Banque Financière the court asked ‘what position would the parties have been 
in if the mistake had not been made?’. This is subtly but importantly different: undoing the 
transaction would have meant awarding BFC a personal claim to the value of the loan 
(presumably against Parc, the court having concluded that the interposition of Mr Herzig was 
irrelevant); putting the parties in the position in which they would have been if BFC had 
secured OOL’s agreement to the conditions of the loan meant OOL ceding priority to BFC. 
This is fixing a transaction, not undoing one.145  
In Menelaou, too, it was precisely the lack of Melissa’s signed consent to the grant of 
a charge that rendered it invalid. To find that the ‘substance of the transaction’ nevertheless 
included both the bank’s agreement with the Menelaous and Melissa’s receipt of a charge-free 
property undermines the initial conclusion that she was not privy to the impugned transaction. 
Like Banque Financière, Melissa was in the position of a third party. Unlike Banque 
Financière, the unpaid vendor’s lien was not something for which the bank could have 
                                               
145 Lord Sumption in Lowick Rose v Swynson [2017] UKSC 32 [30]: it ‘does not restore the parties to their pre-
transfer position. It effectively operates to specifically enforce a defeated expectation’. 
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bargained. Nevertheless, it was in function precisely the same as the charge for which it did. I 
do not, therefore, think that the court was wrong to frame the case similarly.146 Thus, in each 
case, the remedy from subrogation supplied some missing peice of the transaction for which 
the claimant intended but failed to bargain. 
The last case that I will consider in this section is Lowick Rose v Swynson.147 In that 
case, Hunt owned and controlled a company, Swynson Ltd, from which he lent £15m to Evo 
Medical Solutions Ltd (‘EMSL’), to enable EMSL to finance the management buy-out of a 
company trading as ‘Evo’. Before entering into this transaction, Swynson and EMSL instructed 
a firm of accountants, who later adopted the name ‘Lowick Rose LLP’, to carry out due 
diligence on Evo. This Lowick Rose did  negligently, failing to draw attention to various 
problems with Evo’s finances. The buy-out went ahead, and Evo subsequently became a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of EMSL.  
In the course of 2007, Evo began to experience cash-flow problems, and EMSL began 
to default on its interest payments. Hunt caused Swynson to lend some £4.75m to EMSL 
between 2007 and 2008. Evo’s financial position did not improve. On 31 December 2008, Hunt 
and EMSL entered into a refinancing agreement, under which Hunt personally loaned 
£18.663m to EMSL, to be applied in satisfaction of two of the original loans. EMSL did this, 
with the result that only one loan of £3m remained outstanding. Hunt’s objectives were to 
twofold – to remove a non-performing loan from Swynson’s books, and to avoid tax that would 
otherwise have accrued. 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the only remaining question concerned 
the status of the refinanced loans. Lowick Rose argued that the repayment of those loans (albeit 
with money borrowed from Hunt) meant that its negligence had caused Swynson no 
                                               
146 The other explanation – which was Lord Carnwath’s position in the Supreme Court – is that the bank had an 
equitable interest in the purchase money, which interest it could trace to the house. 
147 Indeed, the latter was postponed to allow for the former. 
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recoverable loss. Swynson and Hunt made several arguments in response, one of which was a 
claim that Hunt should be subrogated to Swynson’s claim against Lowick Rose, the latter 
having been unjustly enriched by the negation of its liability to pay damages. 
Lord Sumption considered that the various cases in which subrogation was awarded as 
a remedy for unjust enrichment could be united by following ideas: (i) ‘the absence of the 
stipulated benefit disrupted a relevant expectation about the transaction under which the money 
was paid’148 and (ii) ‘the role of equitable subrogation is to replicate as far as possible that 
element of the transaction whose absence made it defective’.149 
 In the present case, by contrast, Hunt, ‘received the whole of the benefit from the 
transaction for which he had stipulated’,150 namely, the covenant to repay (together with 
security) and ‘cleaning up Swynson’s balance sheet and reducing its liability to tax’.151 In these 
circumstances, he said, subrogation ‘is being invoked so as to enable Mr Hunt to exercise for 
his own benefit the claims of Swynson in respect of an unconnected breach of duty under a 
different transaction between different parties more than two years earlier’.152 The defendant’s 
benefit was thus ‘purely incidental’.153 
Again, I do not think that the answer lies in a search for the interdependence of 
transactions; like Banque Financière and Menelaou, the defendant in Swynson was a third party 
to the impugned transaction. If subrogation was appropriate in the former and not in the latter, 
it must be because the court thought that Hunt’s mistake regarding the effect of his loan on 
Swynson’s extant claim was not – for better or worse – a ‘relevant expectation’. 
                                               
148 Lowick Rose v Swynson [2017] UKSC 32 [31]. 
149 ibid. 
150 ibid [32]. 
151 ibid 
152 ibid. 
153 ibid [20]. 
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None of this has been to make any substantive claims about how rectification by 
subrogation should work, nor whether it should exist at all.154 It has simply been to argue for 
the inoculation of Lord Reed’s ‘single transaction’ tool from these cases. In this regard, I 
welcome Lord Sumption’s conclusion that it would be a mistake ‘to try to fit the subrogation 
cases into any broader category of unjust enrichment’.155  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the 9th edition of Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, the editors wrote that ‘there 
are risks in taking too literally both the idea of a ‘transfer’, and the idea that what is ‘transferred’ 
is ‘value’’.156 I have sought to show the many ways in which those risks have materialised. 
When we made to mediate an  economic shift from cash to bank money, we failed to maintain 
an appropriate focus on the legal mechanism by which a ‘transfer’ is constituted. In this way, 
we have come to extend liability in unjust enrichment to very many defendants with whom 
their respective claimants had no normative link. 
In that respect, the Supreme Court decision in Investment Trust Companies v Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners should be welcomed. A bank transfer from A to B is not an asset 
transfer, but it does involve a legal mechanism that that can be described readily as a 
‘transaction’. However, if we do allow the notion of a transaction to inform the way in which 
we go about showing that there is a ‘transfer’ of the requisite kind, we must not attempt to 
squeeze within it cases that bear only a passing resemblance to that central case. The conceptual 
health of unjust enrichment depends upon it. 
                                               
154 Though it should be clear that it gives substantial assistance to a claimant whose mistake is unilateral, with an 
immediate and substantial cost to a third party 
155 Lowick Rose v Swynson [2017] UKSC 32. 
156 Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [6-04]. 
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